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I. INTRODUCMION

To those who think of Colorado just as purple mountain majesties above
the fruited plains, the northwest corner of the state may come as a surprise.
Out there, the landscape levels ofl into an emptiness of sagebrush and sandstone, of antelope and bizarre flat-topped mesas. The torpid rivers belie their
colorful nanes mad flow tepid and flat. It is a lonely place.
But underneath all of that is the Green River Formation, an oil shale formation that lies beneath parts of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.' The Formation contains about three trillion barrels of oil, an "amount about equal to
the entire world's proven oil reserves."'
It is hard not to get excited about the prospects of oil shale development."
That much oil could lead to energy security and independence. Jobs Would
be created.' Taxes would be collected. Federal and state governmenLs would
collect royalty payments.
It is also hard not to he discouraged about the prospects of oil shale development: interest in oil shale is over a hundred years old," commentators
have been noting the unlikelihood of its development for over forty years, and
it renmins undeveloped to this day. To extract the oil from the rock, the rock
must be heated to somewhere between 650 and 1000 degrees Fahrenheit.!
Because the oil shale in the Green River Formation is so deep underground,
the most likely technique for extraction is an in-situ process, in which drillers
insert heaters into holes in the rock and collect oil as it is released.' No one
has ever demonstrated this technology on a large scale.'
In-situ oil shale development demands significant amounts of water: one
to twelve forty-two-gallon barrels of water are required to extract each barrel of
oil."0 This is, of course, a tremendous amount of water, especially in such an
arid region, but the companies interested in oil shale hold enough water
rights-or are confident that they can purchase additional rights-to begin de1
velopment." The vast majority of these rights are conditional water rights.'
In Colorado, water is the property of the public, not subject to private
1. U.S. GOV'T AccoUNTABIIJTY OFFICE, GAO-11-35, ENERCY-WA TER NEXus: A
BEFlER ANI) COORDINATED UNDERSTANDING OF WATER RISOURCES COUID HI'LP
MITIGATE THE IMPACTS OF POTENTIAL, O1. SHALE DEVEIOPMENT 1 (2010) [hereinafter
GO'r ACCOUNTABILrITY OFFICE..

2.

Id.

3. Nothing in this article is meant to minimize the serious potential social, economic, ,i'(d
environmental problems posed by oil shale develo)ment. See id. at 7-14.
4. See, e.g., jm Falstad, Pace of Constnmcoon in Billings Jumped iL 2013, BII.1NGS
GAZTIr'E, Dec. 29, 2013 (stating that Billings saw record levels of commercial construction in
2013 thanks to the shale oil boom in Nord Dakota).
5.

5eeGoV'TAccouNTABIIJTY OFFICE, supla note 1, at 4.

6. Richard L. Dewsnup, Assembling IVater Rights br a New [e: Needed Refornms ji the
Lm4 17 ROCKYMTN. MIN. L. INsT. 22 (1972).
7. GoV'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, supii note 1, at7.
8. Id.

9. See d.
Id. at 15.
Id.at 25.
12. See geneialy LAWRENCE J. MACI)ONNI.L, W. RESOURCE ADVOCATFS, WATER ON
TH- ROCKS: OIL SHALE. WATER RIGHTs IN COLORADO (2009).
10.
11.
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ownership," but private individuals can-acquire the right to use water by appropriating it and putting it to beneficial use. 4 Between users, the priority of
the appropriation gives the better right" so that in times of scarcity those appropriators with junior rights will have to defer to those with senior rights. Finally, beneficial use is the "basis, measure, and limit" of that right.'6 Conditional rights act as a placeholder in this priority system by allowing
alpropriators to preserve seniority in the time that it takes them to complete
the project to put water to beneficial use.'7 All water rights, both absolute and
conditional, must be appropriated for beneficial use, rather than speculative
investments.'8
The oil companies are not the only holders of conditional rights.
Statewide, conditional claims constitute sixty-one percent of perfected claims,
and some of these are nearly a century old.'" Consequently, holders of conditional rights have been able to retain senior priorities without ever putting the
water to beneficial use.
This Article argues that the current test for canceling conditional rights has
proven ineffective. Part II outlines the policies served by prior appropriation
and analyzes the prohibition against speculation. Parts III and IV examine the
necessity of conditional rights and the general legal doctrines used to grant or
limit conditional rights. With these policy and legal underpinnings in place,
this Article moves to the current state of the law. Part V studies a number of
the most important cases over the last fifteen years, which have substantially
modified the nature of conditional water rights. Part VI discusses these cases
in light of the policies discussed in Part II and argues that current doctrine has
been ineffective at achieving a chief goal of prior appropriation: the wide distribution of water to potential beneficial users.

I. POLICIES SERVED BY PRIOR APPROPRIATION
The prior appropriation system, with its requirement of beneficial use,
serves three fundamental purposes: (i) to prevent speculation and monopolies,
(ii) to prevent waste and overuse, (iii) and to provide users with flexibility in
the water's use.' Of these, this Article focuses prinarily on the problem of
speculation.
Speculation and monopolization are not the same. " Monopoly"refers to
super-concentrated market power, whereby the monopolist controls so much

13.

CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

14. Id.§6.
15. Id.
16. High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719
(Colo. 2005).
17. See intii Part III.
18. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a) (2014).
19. Charles J.P. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Condionai Water Rights il the 1WVestern United
States: Introducing Unertainft, to Prior Appropiiation?,51 J. AM. WATER RESOURcES Ass'N
14, 14,25,29 (2015).
20. Janet C. Neuman, Jencicial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: 77he Inellicient Search for
Eliciencv in WesIer7 Vater Use, 28 EN'TL. L. 919, 963-66 (1998).
21.

Id. at 964.
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of a resource that lie canldepress supply and/or quality and inflate price.""2 In
economic theory, speculation is much more difficult to define, and "a satislactory general definition is still not availahle (and probably never will be)."' To
make matters even more colplicated, tie Colorado Supreme Court has not
always been consistent. The Court has sometimes differentiated between
speculation and monopolization" and sometimes has collapsed the distincFollowing previous commentators, this Article will consider
tion."
"IsIpeculation las] the act of acquiring a resource for the purpose of subse(luent use or resale." ' This definition focuses entirely on intent. But, since
conditional rights may become speculative over time,'7 this Article includes as
speculative those appropriations that have the effect of hoarding water rights
without putting those rights to beneficial use.
In order to analyze how the prior appropriation doctrine tries to prevent
speculation, Subpart A first lays out the philosophical underpinnings of prior
appropriation itself' Subpart B then looks at the two modern rationales for
preventing speculation-that it is a moral wrong and tiat it prevents the wide
distribution of water amnong potential users-and argues that this latter rationale is the better of the two and should forn the basis lor critiques of current doctrine.
A. THE LOCKEAN UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
John Locke wrote the second of the Two 7T'eatises of Government in

1690. " Neither the Colorado Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has
cited him. Yet Locke remains important for a number of reasons. As scholars have noted, Locke's insights are particularly helpful for understanding
both die roots of Western water law and for developing the law for the future."9 Further, recent scholarship by David Schorr has argued that prior ap22.

M.

23. Oliver D. Haut & )avid M. Kreps, Prke Dcstahihlzing Specution, 94 J. Iot. EcON.
927, 928 (1986).
24. Se, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidlcr Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566, 568 (Colo. 1979) ("The right io appropriate is for use, not merely for profit.... To recognize conditional decrees groundced on no interest beyond itdesire to obtain water for sale
would-as a practical matter--discourage those who have need and use for die water from (leveloping it. Moreover, such a rule would encourage those wilh vast monetary resources to monopolize, for personal profit rather than fir beneficial use, whatever unappropriated water rcmllains.").
25. See Pagosa Area Water Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (IJagosa 1),170 P.3d 307, 313 (Colo.
2007) ("Colorado's systiem of public ownership of water, combined with tie creation of public
and private use rights therein by appropriation, circumscribes monopolist pitdalls. When tie
benclicial use requirement was put into practice in the nineteenth centuly, its fundamental p)urpose was to establish tie means for making the public's water resource available to those who
had the actual need f"or tie water, in order to curb speculative hoarding.") (citing David B.
'Schorr, Approprltion as Agp-annisin: Distrilbtive.lusficein the Creation oflropertv Rights,
33 EcoL.. L.Q. 3, 9, 22 (2005)).
26. Sandra Zcllmer, The Anti-Speculation )octrine and At Imnpications /r C'l/abmative
W1;terMamgement, 8 Nrv. Lj. 994, 1005 (2008).
27. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservney Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,
709 (Colo. 1999).
28. JOHN LOCKE, SE.COND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. MacPherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
29. See KENICHI MATsui, NATIVE PEOPLFS AND WATER RIGHTS: IRRIGATION, DAMS, AND

WA TE? LA TV REVIE IV

Volume 18

propriation developed as an expression of radical Lockeanism. ° Schorr's
work is particularly important because the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly embraced it when striking down conditional water rights as unduly
speculative."
Locke dedicates much of the Second 7Teatise to his theory of property."
For Locke, one's own labor belongs to oneself, and applying that labor to nature creates a property right in that resource." Labor is essential, and tie application of labor is the moment of creation of private property-the applied
labor distinguishes the natural resources now held as private property from the
resources still held in common.' Locke's example is particularly relevant:
Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt,
but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labourhath taken it
out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all
her children, and hath thereby appropriateclitto himself.'
But appropriation has limits. The law of nature forbids appropriation if it
leads to spoilage," and the appropriator can only appropriate that which could
be traced to actual labor: "As muc]h land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property." " The law of nature and the theory of property thus linit a person even in the absence of others. One could not take all the apples or shoot all the game lor him or
herself, for the inevitable spoilage would violate the law of nature. Nor could

THE LAW IN WESTERN CANADA 31 (2009); Alfred G. CuzAn, Approp~ators VesLus Expropatos: The Political Economy of Water i the West, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13, 14-17 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1983); Joe B. Stevens, John Locke, Eniironmental Property and Instrean Water Rights, 72
LAND ECON. 261,262 (1996).
30.

DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RiGrrs, CORPORATIONS, AND

DISTRIBUTIVEJUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 26-27 (2012). This is not to say that early miners were reading the Second Treatise by candlelight. Instead, Locke is helpful for understanding the political environment of the nineteenth century. C Laura J. Scalia, The Mamy
Faces of Locke ln America's Early Nineteenth-Centu-y 1emocTatic Philosophy 49 POL.
REs. Q. 807, 814-21, 30-32 (1996) (explaining that no other philosopher more closely paralleled the views of politicians and citizens in early nineteenth-century America, but warning that
Locke's teachings are too ambiguous to be considered a single political belief).
31. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Jeviving the Public OwmrershiA Antispeculation, ald Ieneliciad Use Moorings of Pn'or Appiopriation Water Lalw, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 105-06
(2013) (noting Schon's "brilliant work"). Justice Hobbs has been Schorr's primary advocate,
but his speculation opinions have garnered a majority of the Court. See Pagosa 1, 170 P.3d
307, 313 n.5 (Colo. 2007) (citing Schorr, supin note 25, at 9, 22; David B. Schorr, 7he First
Water-PvriiatjationDelate: Colorado Water Corporationsin die Gilded Age, 33 ECOL. L.Q.
313, 319-20 (2006)); High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d
710, 719 n.3 (Colo. 2005) (citing Schorr, supl-a note 25, at 33, 41, 55-56). Justice Hobbs has
relied on Schon in other water law contexts as well. See In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission
Clause for 2011-2012 No. 45, 274 P.3d 576, 585 n.2 (Colo. 2012) (Hobbs, J., dissenting) (citing Schorr, supra note 25, at 4).
32. Much of the following discussion is indebted to Stevens, supra note 29.
33. LOCKE, supra note 28, §§ 27-28.
34. Id. §28.
35. I. § 29 (emphasis in original).
36. Id.§31.
37. Id.§ 32 (emphasis in original).
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one claim land without applying labor to it. The law of appropriation thus has
a moral element for Locke, expressed in two ways. First, there is the sense
that spoilage is immoral. Second, the act of working-and being rewarded with
the fruits of one's labor through tie creation of private property-is a moral act
in itself, a kind of virtue ethics. "God gave the world.., to the use of the indlustrious and rational, (and labourwas to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.
The second limitation on appropriation comes from the presence of others. For Locke, the appropriation could not harn others. By limiting one's
property to that to which one has applied labor, one could not appropriate
away from others, and could not exclude others who had a better claim to the
property. " Again, Locke's example is relevant:
No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though
he took a good (fraught, who had a whole river of the sate water left him to
quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of
both, is perfectly the same."

There comes a point, however, when one cannot appropriate water without hurting others-the entire problem of the West is that there is not enough
water to begin with. In this scenario, Locke argues that society is better off because of the prior appropriations, that "he who appropriates land to lhimself
by his labour, does not lessen, but increases the common stock of mankind.""
This is an early example of cost-benefit balancing,2 where, "Iflor those without
rights, money and commerce have allowed them to share in the social product
created by the initial appropriators."'
From this, one can build the doctrine of prior appropriation from
scratch." In the state of nature that was the early mining camnps, ' the water
was a public resource, available for use by appropriation." A person could
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 34 (emphasis in original).
Id. § 36.
I.§ 33.

41.

Id§37.

42. See Stevens, supra note 29, at 264.
43. Id. at 267.
44. Locke's English example most appropriately describes the re sonable use requircmcnt
of riparian water law. See JOSHUA G-iIZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON
LAW 1 (2004). Even so, western prior appropriation is an evolution of Locke's property theory.
MA'rsuI, supi-ii note 29, at 31.
45. See Stevens, supra note 29, at 262-63 (describing the mining camps as "a most
Lockeat setting" iii which the development of de doctrine of prior appropriation developed
"in the Lockean tradition of how man evolves out of a state of nature into civil society-via private property amd assent to a government that would protect that )ro)erty").
46. C(ompare LOCKE, supi note 28, § 26 ("The earth, Mad all that is therein, is given to
men for the support and comfort of tiheir being. And dio' all the fiits it naturally produces,
and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in comnion, as they are produced by the spontamcous
hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of nankind,
in any of them, as they arc thus in deir natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there
must of necessity be a mneals to appropriate ihcm some way or other, before they can be of any
use, or at all beneficial to any pauiicular man." (emphasis in original)), wit1h COLO. CONST. art.
XVI, § 5 ("The water of every naural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the sume is dedicated to the
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appropriate water, but could not waste it. From these principles-that one
must apply water to a beneficial use and that one can acquire property only
through labor-comes the topic of this Article, the prohibition against speculation.
B. THE CRITIQUE OF SPECULATION
1. Speculation as a Moral Wrong
Western water has a distinctive feature: the right to use water is a property
right that can be bought and sold like other property rights,' but it cannot be
held and sold purely for profit.
That any speculation is evil or is a moral wrong is well-engrained in popular culture,'9 though laws in other areas tly to regulate and control speculation
rather than prohibit it altogether. The laws that apply to water "are highly distinctive and apply to 'virtually nothing else."'" In western water law, then,
there is "a strong sense that speculation in water is just plain wrong.""
Courts have sometimes resorted to this type of moral language. The Colorado Supreme Court has called speculation the "sinister purpose, "5' and it
has noted that "IsIpeculation on the market, or sale expectancy, is wholly foreign to the principle of keeping life in a proprietary right and is no excuse for
failure to perform that which the law requires. " 5

use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.").
47. Compare LOCKE, supra note 28, § 31 ("As much as any one can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is
bcyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others."), Kith COLO. REST. STAT. § 37-92103(4) (2014) ("'Beneficial use' means the use of that amount of water that is reasonable awd
appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for
which the appropriation is lawfully made."), and High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 (Colo. 2005) ("Actual beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of an appropriation.").

48. See Zachary Donohew, Propety Rights and WIVcstclm United States Water Markets, 53
AUSTL.J. AGRIC. & RESOURCt ECON. 85, 90 (2009).

49. See, e.g., Sebastian Lot & Andrea R. Fix, Not All FiancdSpeculation Is heated
Equally: LIypeople's MoralJudgments About Speculative Short Selling, J. EcON. PSYCHOL.,
Aug. 2013, at 34, 35 ("More or less implicitly, financial speculation-either short or long-has
always been subjected to moral judgnent. In fact, financial speculation has been viewed as
somewhat similar to gambling, which is-to say the least-more closely associated wvith immoral
behavior than moral behavior."); Marc Levinson, An Eil Virus Is Upon Us- 7he Real Problem
Is am Old Scourgc: Spueculation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 49; Sarah Mclnerney, Labour
TI) Sugests bind Plice Cap to Stop Booms, SUNDAY TiMEs (London), Oct. 20, 2013, at 2
(speculation of real property); David Warren, lditorial, A Weapon Agaist the Great Inflationar, Evls, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 18, 2012, at A9 (speculation of currency); Joe Zhang, China
Deprives Itself of Monetary Tools, WA1i. ST. J. (Asia), June 5, 1995, at 6 (speculation of filtures); cf. People v. Weller, 207 A.D. 337, 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (discussing speculation
and theatre tickets).
50. Zclhncr, supra note 26, at 1011 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers:
Communi, Rights and ie Pnvatization of latei; I HASTINGS W.-Nw. .1.ENIL. L. & POL'Y
13, 14 (1994)).
51. Id. at 1030.
52. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2(1 273, 284 (Colo. 1961).
53. Knapp v. Colo. River Conservation Dist., 279 P.2d 420, 427 (Colo. 1955). Of course,
this is circular: the doctrine of beneficial use was designed to prevent speculation, and specula-
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The Court came closer to articulating the rationale for the prohibition of
speculation in Ciy & Count, of Denver v. ANorhern Colo1i1lo 14aler Conservancy Distric,5' in which the Court condemned "promoters and speculators-not appropriators" who had "d[onel only token work to give pretense of
a right which they might sell."" Indeed, "mere speculators... caninot by
survey, plat and token construction compel subsequent bona lide appropriators to pay them tribute by purchasing their claims in order to acquire a right
guaranteed them by our Constitution." ;
This last passage hints at two of the primary reasons why speculation in
water seems morally wrong. The right to appropriate-unlike, say, the right to
purchase land or commodity f-utures-is a right the Colorado Constitution
guaraitees.5 In other words, to deprive those who would actually use the water is to deprive them of their constitutional right. This raises the second reason why speculation in water seems morally wrong: there is a strong suggestion
that those who do work-here the "bona fide appropriators" against the "mere
speculators"-are morally preferable to those who do not.
This leads back to Locke, for "Locke's injunction that a person has a right
to that property which 'he hath mixed his Labour with' can be used to attack
the speculator and trader in the name of the 'workingman."'.. In other words,
"Ipiroperty derived from trade or speculation Idoes] not possess the same
moral justification as property derived from 'real' work."
Of course, the moral justification for the antispeculation doctrine is hardly
compelling, especially when the law permits speculation in any number of
Further, in light of economists' strong.
other natural resources."
pro-speculation arguments, it is hard to justify the law's approach in promoting personal virtue ethics.
2. Hoarding and Distributive justice
A better argument for the antispeculation doctrine is that it helps to distribute the scarce resource among potential beneficial users. This is consistent
with Professor Schorr's interpretation of radical LockeanisIm.
The prohibition against speculation is part of prior appropriation itself:
fon is wrong because it is inConsiStent with benClicial use.

54. 276 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1954).
55.

Id.at 1008.

56. Id. at 1009.
57. Sec Lotz & Fix, supi- note 49, at 35 (suggesting that laypcrson's bias conics from a general intuitve notion of fairness, "whereas understanding the upsides of speculaion usually requires reflective judgmnent").

58. Richardj. Ellis, Raitcdlxockeanism ,hl Aincuican PolitcalCturec, 45 W. IOl.. Q. 825,
827 (1992) (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 828.
60. Sec c.g , UI.RICH KRACH, THE SECRETS OF SUCCFSSFUL SPECl'I\TION: WHAT \VAIL
STREM1 DOESN'T WAINT You To KNow 224 (2008) ("Timber as an investment has actually
beaten the stock mauket, %ith less risk, over the long run.... lAldding timberland to a welldiversified portlolio enhances the return potential, while reducing risk (volatility)."). To be lair,
though, this raises tie reverse question: If speculation in water is so wrong, why is speculation in
other natural resources not? See infira note 257 for a discussion of the problems of timber
speculation.

61.

See inlia Part II.C.
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courts established the beneficial use requirement as a "general anti-speculation
doctrine of appropriation law targeting big water corporations in practice.""
The beneficial use requirement came directly from the mining carps, and its
purpose was to prevent absentee owners from selling the water at a profit and
to make the water available for actual users."
Fears of speculation and monopolization were not limited to water law,'
but were "expressions of an agrarian, populist world view widespread in the
western United States in the nineteenth century, an ideology locked in a secular struggle with corporate capitalism and speculative investment, particularly
in western lands."' Scarce resources created concerns amnong western settlers
that the resources would not be available to the actual settlers and miners, but
instead would "be disposed of to absentee speculators and corporations controlled by eastern and European investors."'
The earliest Colorado reference to the prohibition against speculation appears to be in Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co." The Court in Colnbs cited
no precedent for the prohibition against speculation-rather, the prohibition
derived directly from the requirement of beneficial use.6" This prohibition was
62. SCHORR, supra note 30, at 75. There is occasionally some confusion about the difference between the general prohibition against speculation and the Vdler mtispeculafion doctrinc, awd sometimes the two are conflated. See, e.g., Doug Cannon, Closing the I)oor on Waler Speculations: Nevada's Adoption of the Anti-Speculation Doctrine, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2009,
at 12, 13; Casey S. Funk & Daniel J. Arnold, Pagosa-7he Great and Growing Cities Doctrine
rnpeneled: An Objec've Look from a Biased JPerspeetive, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 283,
293 (2011); see also City ofThornton v. Bijou Inigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996). The
distinction is this: courts have always prohibited speculation, but Vidler established an important bright-line test.
63. SCHORR, supra note 30, at 19-22.
64. See id. at 26-27, 96-97.
65. Iclat 25. Water law is not the only area where these concerns have been relevant. See,
e.g., Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Emnpfiiad
Analysis of Independent Politica Spending, 89 IND. Lj. 315, 331 (2014) ("Modern campaign
linance laws are rooted in tie Progressive Era of the early 1900s and were a part of a broad political reforn movement to limit the power of corporate interests over state legislatures (e.g.,
railroad 'robber barons' in California and 'copper kings' in Montana) ...." (footnote omitted)).
After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citiens United ir Fed. Elections Conmn 'n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010), Montana unsuccessfully tried to defend its campaign expenditure law on its
unique state history of corruption. Spencer & Wood, supra, at 337-39.
66. SCHORR, supra note 30, at 25, 71. The fear of outsiders is still alive and well today. See
Aaron Pettis, Note, 7hkings and the Right to Fish and Float in Colorado, 89 IND. LJ. 473, 474
n. 10 (2014) (describing a widespread xenophobic attitude of Coloradans toward Texan outsiders).
67. 28 P. 966 (Colo. 1892).
68. Id. at 968 ("The constitution provides that the water of natural streams may be diverted
to beneficial use; but the privilege of diversion is granted only for uses truly beneficial, and not
for purposes of speculation."). The doctrine in Combs was unremarkable among the Western
states at the time. See, e.g., Miocene Ditch Co. v. Campion Mining & Trading Co., 3 Alaska
572, 585-86 (D.Alaska 1908) ("The evidence shows that even the leading officers of the Miocene Ditch Company regarded the Hammond location and diversion as made, or at least held,
for speculative purposes merely. If made with no intent to construct a ditch to be devoted to
some beneficial or useful industry, the law would annex to the location no validity as an appropriation of the water attempted to be converted to tie locator's benefit. I1That tie locator,
with intention to locate a water right and hold it for speculaive and not for beneficial uses, gains
no rights by going through the forms of locating a vater right, is supported by numerous auithorites ... ."); Weaver v. Eureka Lake Co., 15 Cal. 271, 272-73 (1860) ("To render valid a claim
of water by appropriation, the claim must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, or in con-
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bolstered by the public policy argument that speculation would drive consuiners out of the market and would prevent irrigation." The argument retains vitality today and is often deployed by the Colorado Supreme Court.7 That rationale-that the opporttnity to use those priorities would not be fairly
distributed-remains the most convincing argument for the prohibition against
speculation.
C. A BRIEF DEFENSE OF SIECULATION
Among the criteria bandlied about in public discussions on the allocafion of
water supplies are such phrases as "fair shares," "reasonable requiremenLs,"

"nieeds," "beneficial uses," etc.; in some cases these can only be regarded as
7

noises with emotive content used its substitutes for rational analysis.

Locke took one more step that never made it into Colorado water law: he
reevaluated appropriation rules in light of the introduction of mroney.2 Since
tImplation of a future appropriation for such purpose by the parties claiming it. A claim I'r
mere speculation will not answer.
A] bare claim to a water right without some actual steps

towards appropriation, could confer no rights capable of ownership or" sale."); Toohey v.
Campbell, 60 P. 396, 397 (Mont. 1900) ("The policy of the law is to prevent a person from acquiring exclusive control of a streamn, or any parth eireol, not for )resent and actual beneficial
use, but for mere fturre speculative profit or advantage, without regard to existing or contemplated beneficial uses."); Nev. Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 45 P. 472, 482-83 (Or. 1896) ("The water
of a public streal is evCntualdly applied to a benelicial use .... Nor is such a rule consistent or
congenial with the creation and fostering of monopolies in tie use of the waters of public
streams. The appropriator cannot withhold the water from a beneficial use .... IThe plaintfil']
had a reasonable expectation that there would he a denand for water as soon as they could
convey it to a convenient place for the intended use, aud in this respect the scheme could not
be said to be merely speculative, impracticable, or visionary."). But ce Scherck v. Nichols, 95
13.2d 74, 78-79 (Wyo. 1939) (acknowledging the Thohety rule but noting that mere speculation
"is hardly possible under the extensively regulative laws of tfis state"). While these cases might
come out differcntly today (especially Nevada Ditch Co.), the point is simply that early coums
were concerned about speculation and monopoly and derived this doctrine directly from the
requirement of benelicial use.
In tie years following Comls, parties occasionally raised the argument that an appropriation was unduly speculative, but early cases were decided on other grounds. See, e.g., Bijou
Irrigation Dist. v. Weldon Valley Ditch Co., 184 P. 382, 385-86 (Colo. 1919); Blakely v. Ft.
Lyon Canal Co., 73 P. 249, 255 (Colo. 1903). Trial courts were receptive to tie argument,
dtough, and were %illing to cancel water iights that they found speculative. See, e.g., Hough v.
Lucas, 230 P. 789, 790 (Colo. 1924).
69. Combs, 28 P. at 968 ("1l1f ditch companies were at liberty to divert water without limit,
and at the satie time make the ownership of stock an absolute condition precedent to the right
to procure water from their inigating canals,-water rights would soon become a matter of speculation and nmonopoly, and tillers of the soil would have to pay exorbitant rates for the use of
water, or our arid lands would becomc untproductive."). But c/ Zelliner, suipai
note 26, at 1023
(noting that speculation and monopoly are distinct problems).
70. lK.g., Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison River 'Watcr Conservancy Dist., 142
P.3d 1265, 1277 (Colo. 2006) ("'He pu)ose of the 'can and will' statute is to subject conditional rights 'to contintued scrutiny to prevent the hoarding of priorities to die detriment of those
sceking to apply de state's water beneficially.' . . . Accordingly, the 'substantial probability'
standard is eip)loyed to curb indefinite speculation, not to protect a conditional water right
where only tie thiinest possibility remains that the project can ard will be completed." (citations omitled)).
71. .ACK HIRSHLEIFER, JAMES C. D HAVEN & JEROME W. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPx:
ECONOMICS, TFCHNOLOGY, AND POIcY 36 (1960).
72. See LOCKE, supi-a note 28, §§ 36-37.
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money cannot spoil, appropriators could avoid the strictures of the law of nature by over-appropriating and selling natural resources." Appropriators
could accumulate money without the fear of spoilage.
Colorado water law refused to take this step. The. prohibition against
speculation in water treats water as something fundamentally different from
other sources, often couched in the necessity of water to both life and livelihood." While this notion is deeply engrained in western water law, it produces much eye-rolling among economists, who reject the "nonsense [that] has
been written on the unique importance of water supply to the nation or to particular regions.... Ibecausel Iwihatever reason we cite ... the alleged unique
imnportnmce of water disappears upon analysis."73 In this view, water is just like
any other economic good-that is, "an economist might be defined as someone who doesn't see anything special about water.". For the economist, the
true evil is not speculation on the market, but speculation taking the place of
reason.

Despite the popular antipathy toward speculation, economists typically favor it because it is economically efficient. In general, economists argue that
speculation serves a number of goals: it shifts the risk of failure onto those
who are most able to bear it," it helps adjust market prices to more accurately
reflect supply and demand,"9 it allows development to take place at an appropriate time' ° mad in creative or innovative ways,' and it allows the marketrather than the judiciary-to correct failures."
These justifications for speculation are not exclusive to water, either.
73. Id. § 37.
74. See Zellmer, supla note 26, at 1008.
75. HIRSHLEIFER .'AL., supra note 71, at 4-5.
76. Timothy D. Tregarthen, 1Watcr in Colorado:Fearand Loatidng of the MaukctpIlac, in
WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOcATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 29, at 119, 119-20 ("Neither water's great usefulness nor its scarcity pose problems
that distinguish it Frtom other economic goods.").

77. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators:Regulation anod Private Ordering
in dte Market for OTCDeivatives, 48 DUKE LJ. 701, 707 (1999).
78. See Richard A. Epstein, Whj' Restrui Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 989
(1985).
79. Stout, supia note 77, at 707.
80. Daphna Lewisohn-Zamir, More Is Not Alays Better than Less: An ELplomztion in
PropertyLim, 92 MINN. L. REv. 634, 694 (2008).
81. See Epstein, supranote 78, at 989.
82. Tregarthen, sup,a note 76, at 124 ("One wonders how other markets would function if
such judicial determinations of usefulness were required."). A nineteenth-century newspaper
put it like this:
To make a long matter short, what has tie government to do with speculation or
overtrading, that this continued war upon all credit should 'be kept up for their prevention? Why not enjoin it upon all to fill the ground, because tie price of grain is
high? Why not establish a curfew-bell to ring all subjects to bed, because they burn
too much whale-oil? Why not lay an excise on butcher's meat, because, forsooth,
men eat more beef than is wholesome? Ordinary nien have supposed that such matters were better left alone than meddled with; but our rulers choose to try experiments for the purpose of settling the question to their own satisfaction.
Editorial, Speculation and Overtrading,DAILY HFRALD & GAZETrE (Cleveland), May 2, 1837,
at 2.
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Speculative investing shifts risk onto investors in two ways. First, investors
bear the risk of uncertain water supplies, caused both by year-to-year fluctualions in rain and snowfall and the persistent threat of climate change."3 For
economists, this uncertainty makes water especially suitable for the marketthat is, adjustments to the water xnmaket can reallocate risk just like any number of other markets. " If the value or supply of water plummets, the investor
bears the loss.' The second way that speculation shifts risk is that it allows investors, rather than consumers, to bear the risk of failed projects.' In this
sense, speculaion is not limited to a strict econonic definition but includes
any right that would be canceled by a court. Because Vidler requires that an
appropriator have either firmi contractual commitments or an agency relationship with the end beneficial user, only users of water itself-not investors--carry
the risk of faed projects .
Furthermore, the antispeculation doctrine is undesirable to the extent that
it hampers viable water markets. Commentators have argued that treating water like any other economic good has the potential to solve the very real probWater
lems of inefficient agricultural use mid environmental degradation.
markets facilitate the distribution of water according to its most valuable econonic use. Thus, since "Itihe economic value of [agriculturall water to cities
dwarfs the value of the same water to the farmers1,] lilt makes economic sense
to let the water support the higher value activity." Thus, the argument goes,
the result under Colorado water law is the unnecessary injection of the judiciary into matters that the market should regulate.'

83. This is apparent to anyone who has ever lived in Colorado. Sec City & Cnty. of Denver
v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. 1939) ("The water flow in ]the South Plattel is extrcnely
die water rights of the city originating therefrom is far
diom
variable. The stream and the yield
from uniform."); Van Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co. v. City of Cheyenme, 54 P.2d 906,
908 (Wyo. 1936) ("The climate in WNyoming and throughout the Rocky Mountains is semiarid;
tie precipitation of rain mid snow is light, irregular, and uncertain as to time."). Not only does
annual precipitation vary wildly, but climate change shortens tie snow season, causes faster
snow melt, increases run off, and creates higher evaporation losses. Robert Glennon, Wulaer
Scacitv, Marketing, and hvatiaion,83 TEx. L. Rrv. 1873, 1874-75 (2005) ("Higher temperattires produce a shorter snow season (more precipitation falls in the lorm of rain), faster snow
melt, and increased runoff. . ..Globd warming also creates higher evaporation losses from the
suifaces of lakes, reservoirs, and rivers.").
84. Tregarthen, .s'upia note 76, at 120-21.
85. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2d 273, 288 (Colo. 1961) (asserting those who invest time, money, and energy into unsuccessful water supply prqjects bear the loss); Stout, supra note 77, at 736-37 (arguing speculators in
trade agreements, such as farners, risk bearing a loss by selling later at market price rather than
early at a lower price).
86. See Tregarthen, supia note 76, at 132.
87. Id.
88. Glcnnon, supia note 83, at 1888.
89.
d.
90. Trega-then, supra note 76, at 135-36 ("The courts that regulate this market have exhibited, in ruling after ruling, a fundamental lack of contidence in the eflicacy of private-market
solutions. The result is a needlessly costly and unceilain system in which innovation is difficult.
The fea -ad loathing of teiprivate market. under prior appropriation doctrine, of course, does
have one other signilicmt result-a greatly expanded role for tie judicial system that administers
it."); cf mIia text accompanying note 119. Of course, those on tie losing side ol judicial decisions are often wont to argue that the courts have overstepped their authority. Cf Funk & Arnold, supra note 62, at 312 (criticizing the role of trial courts after Pagosa 1). But see Pagosa
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This discussion is not an exhaustive defense of water speculation; cornmeenters have raised some important counterarguments.9' Rather, this brief
defense highlights the problems with a moral prohibition on water speculation-in other words, that it is not as easy as sinply dismissing it as "evil" or
"sinister." The perception that there is something intrinsically different about
water is so deeply engrained within the culture and courts that it is unlikely to
change. Still, the arguments based on the presumed evil of speculation are
not persuasive. A more persuasive argument is that water held without being
put to beneficial use removes that water firom the pool of resources available
to those who could use it immediately.
This is important conceptually as well. If speculation is evaluated by how
it affects third parties, then it is more appropriate to talk about speculative elfects rather than speculative intent."

III.CONDITIONAL RJGHTS
The problem with the beneficial use doctrine is readily apparent: if water
rights do not form until appropriators put the water to beneficial use, then appropriators cannot secure rights until after they complete a project, at which
time other appropriators may have gained seniority over them. Without protection, appropriators have no incentive to engage in long-term, complicated
projects. To solve this problem, early courts developed the doctrine of conditional water rights. '
Conditional water rights are an exception to the rule that appropriators
must put water to beneficial use before they can establish a right."4 A conditional water right is "a right to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon
the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which
such water right is to be based." " Conditional rights thus serve as placeholders
within the priority system and allow an appropriator to preserve seniority

Area Wafer & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I4, 219 P.3d 774, 788 (Colo. 2009)
(dedicating half a page to rebutting Funk and Arnold's argument). While Colorado has the
strictest antispeculation doctrine in the West, Zielhner, suplta note 26, at 1027, its water law is
practicafly laissez laire compared to the permit systems of other states, which allow applications
to be denied for any number of grounds, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (2014)
("[WIhen the application or the proposed use conflicts with vested rights, is a menace to public
safety, or is against the interests and welfare of the public, the application shall he rejected.");
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370(3) (2014) (requiring the State Engineer to conside r, among other
things, "Iwlhether the proposed action is environmentally sound as it relates to the basin from

which the water is exported," "Iwihether the proposed action is an appropriate long-tenn use
which will not unduly limit the future growth and development in the basin from which the water is exported," and "lalny other factor the State Engineer deternines to he relevant").
91.

SeegencildlyZellmer, supra note 26.

92. The Colorado Supreme Court has sometimes used this type of language. Se, e.g.,
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 709 (Colo. 1999) ("IAI conditional right, or some portion of that right, may become speculative over
time.... ").
93. See Sieber v. Frink, 2 P. 901, 903-04 (Colo. 1884). In a case of reciprocity, Nevada
recently adopted Colorado's antispeculation doctrine. Bacher v. Office of State Eng'r, 146 P.3d
793, 798-99 (Nev. 2006).
94. See Centennial Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Broomlield, 256 P.3d 677,

684 (Colo. 2011).
95.

Cot.o. REV'. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (2014).
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while completing the necessary steps for the project.'
The rule has generally remained unchanged since Siebe,; 7 though the
Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as requiring a three-part
test. To establish a conditional water right, the applicant mus( demonstrate
that (i) it has taken a first step toward appropriation, (ii) its intent is not speculative, and (iii) "there is a substantial probability that the applicant 'can and
will' complete the appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time.""
The first requirement is a notice requirement for other users. The second requirement is the statutory version of the Vidlerantispeculation doctrine. The
third requirement is the statutory imposition of the can-and-will doctrine.
Even though an appropriator can use the doctrine of conditional water
rights for any size of water project,' the doctrine is especially important for the
type of large-scale projects that are increasingly dominating the most important
questions in Colorado water law.' °" As the Colorado Supreme Court has noted, "The doctrine of relation back is a legal fiction in derogation of the consti.
tution for the benetit of claimants tinder kuger and more dillicult )roLjecs.'
While tei prohibition against speculation is intrinsic to the doctrine of
prior appropriation itself, ' the prohibition can be separated into two general
eras, divided in 1979 by Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler
7unnel Water Co., which established the modern bright-line test for determining speculation.'
A. BALANCING BEFORE VIDLER
Before Vidle,; courts were able to approach the antispeculation doctrine
with more discretion. These cases show that courts would give substantial
leeway to important projects as long as the applicant put in some effort to develop the project.
The definitive example of balancing speculation against prospective de96. Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d 383,
387 (Colo. 1982) ("The purpose of a conditional water decree has always been to dlow an ultim
appropriation of water to relate back to (lhe lime of tie 'first step' toward that appropriation.").
97. Compare Sichce; 2 P. at 903-04 ("Although the appropriation is not deelmed complete
until th6 actual diversion or use of the watrer, still, if such work be prosecuted vith reasonable
diligence, the right relates to the time when the first step was taken to secure it." (quoting Ophir
Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 544 (1869))), wilh COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(6) (2014) ("'Conditional water right' means a righl to perfect a water right with a certain
prioity upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such
water right is to be based.").
98. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056,1064 (Colo. 2013).
99. Se, e.g., Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 42 (Colo. 1997) (project using
ten c.f.s. of water); Talco, Ltd. v. Danielson, 769 P.2d 468, 469 (Colo. 1989) (project using
0.555 c.fs.); Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of l)enver, 511 P.2d 25, 28 (Colo.
1973) (project. using one hundred c.t.s.).
100. Cf A. 1)an Tarlock, JriorAppropn'aion: Rule, Princile, or Rheioi'?, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 881, 895 (2000) (discussing the decreasing importalIe of agriculture, especially small in-igation comnmunities, anod die associated rise in importance of urban water planning interests).
101. City & Cnty. of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (Colo. 1954).

102. Se supia Pat II.B.2.
103.

594 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Colo. 1979).
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velopment appears in City & County of Denver v. Sheri[f in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that it would not hold cities to the same scrutiny for
speculation as it would other appropriators."' Indeed, "it is not speculation
but the highest prudence on the part of the city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs resulting from a nornmal increase in population
within a reasonable period of time."'03 The Court chastised the defendants'
lawyers who, in approaching the rights as if they were for agricultural use,
"dlidl not fully comprehend the issues involved in this case" and "missledl entirely the outstanding fact that more than one-third of the population of the
state is seeking a measure of security in water supply."'0 6 The balancing struck
in Sheriffis so important that the entire antispeculation doctrine would likely
be unworkable without it."'°
Mid-century cases reflect the Colorado Supreme Court's willingness to
support large-scale projects. The point is apparent: large projects are essential
to the wellbeing of the state and they need some lexibility. No matter what
evil the Robber Barons wreaked upon the West, they were instrumental in
developing the country, creating a national infiastructure, and "creatling]
enormous national wealth and dramatically raisling American living standards."' Likewise, significant prQjects-especially complicated projects that require tunneling through the Continental Divide-need some sort of leeway in
their development.
In Taussig v. Motllt Tunnel Water & 1Development Co.,"' the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld conditional rights for a transmountain project that carried Western Slope water into the South Platte basin."0 The water company
had spent money trying to develop the water,"' but there was no indication of
how the water would be used or who would use it."' The Court, in upholding
the conditional rights, emphasized the necessity of large-scale projects and the
protection that courts should give these projects."'
Twenty years later, the Court relied heavily on Taussig in upholding another transmountain diversion in Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass n
v. Colorado River Water Conservation District."' There, appropriators

104.
105.
106.
107.

96 P.2d 836, 840-42 (Colo. 1939).
Id.at841.
Id.at 840-41.
C Zellner, supi-a note 26, at 1029. The doctrine has seen important changes in recent

years. Sec inifra Part V.B.2.
108. Christian C. Day, Risky Business: PopularImages and Reality of Capital Markets HandligRisk-Fron the Tulip Craze to the Decade of Greed, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 461, 507-08

(2008).
109. 106 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1940).
110. Id.at 365-68.
111. Id. at 366.
112. Seeid.at367.

113. See id. at 366 ("All the Facts and circumstances surrounding these claims indicate an
Only under the circumstances before us would it be
possible for private enterprise to bring water firom the Western Slope to the South Platte basin
enterprise of considerable magnitude.

on the Eastern Slope. Until there is a reasonable assurance culminating in conditional decrees,
such as are before us, it would not be possible for any private enterprise to risk such a large
").
anount of capital ....
114. 365 P.2d 273, 285-86 (Colo. 1961).
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sought to divert Western Slope water from the Eagle River, then transfer the
water across the mountains into the Arkansas River Basin, and finally
transport the water into the South Platte River Basin."" The Arkansas water
would reach Pueblo and the South Platte water Denver, Aurora, and Colorado Springs."' The trial court found, among other things, that the entire "project Iwasi speculative, the financing uncertain and that there Iwas] no need for
the water to be appropriated."' The Colorado Supreme Court quickly rejected these findings as having no evidentiary basis."' The Court dismissed the
fear of speculation that had compelled the trial court:
Similar views and fears prevailed with reference to the Big Thompson, Molat Tunnel, Roberts Tunnel and other major projects-to many if not most people, flese projects appeared to be the dreams of visionaries; today ihey are bencicent realities.
The trial court had no right to substitute its opinion as to the course of fiture events,
for that of those char'ged wid the duty of supplying adequate walcr for municipalities
and other public bodics, who have made eareful studies of the questions and problems presented and have in good iith put their vision, work, money and energies into a1s)rogram by which they seek to put the public waters of the state to beneficial
use.

While the Court had called speculation a "sinister purpose" earlier in its
opinion,' 0 this passage reads like a modern economic justification for speculation-that markets, rather than courts, should determine the allocation of water.'"' The Court even concluded with a straightfon'ard endorsement of the
risk-shifting justification of speculation: "If they have miscalculated and fail,
the loss is theirs-if they succeed, it will be for the eternal benefit of the peoples of the state of Colorado .....
.Inthis, the Court, channeling Locke,' found
that proper appropriations imbued with labor increase the overall wellbeing of

everyone as a whole. Consequently, the loss of opportunity for others to appropriate is less significant, since everyone would be better off if the project
succeeded. The Court's reliance on Tausslalso siggests that it was not relying on a public work's involvement; instead, it appears as if the Cout's rationale could apply equally to private appropriators.'2 '
This is not to say that courts were unwilling to find speculation. Brnger v.
Uncompaigr'e Valley Waler Useirs Ass 'n' represents one of the more tentative projects proposed, and one of the easier cases to decide. 1ungerinvolved
a "complex and massive" plan that collected water froim multiple Western
Slope rivers and redistributed the water to rivers and unbiilt reservoirs on

117.
118.
119.
120.

ld. at 275.
kd.at 275, 277-78.
Id.
at287.
Idat287-88.
ld.
at 288.
Id. at 284.

121.
122.
123.

See spila Part I I.C.
Metro. Suburblm,365 P.2d at 288.
See supia Part II.A.

124.

See Melo. Suburtban, 365 P.2d at 285.

115.
116.

125. 557 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1976), dhavowmed on othergounds by City of Aspen v. Colo. Rivcr Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 758, 763-65 (Colo. 1985).
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both sides of the Continental Divide. ' Unused water would flow back into
the Gunnison River,'" with the "only purpose in seeking an appropriation was
to save the water for Colorado. JBunger] merely expressed Hopes to irrigate
600,000 acres of land-where and owned by whom he had no idea."' " Bunger's intent was probably not speculative in the sense of an appropriation made
solely for its sale expectancy. Instead, it seems like a harebrained scheme that
was high on hopes but low on logistics. The move between Metropolitrm
Suburban and Bunger has less to do with speculation per se but with the practicalities of the projects at hand.
B. VIDLER

In 1979, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Colorado River vater
Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., a which established the beginning of the modern era of the antispeculation doctrine by establishing a
bright-line test for speculative use. To survive a challenge of speculation, the
appropriator must demonstrate either a firm contract or an agency relationship with a proposed user who will put the water to beneficial use.' 0 Vidler
has become more than just precedent: it has become the talisman that the
Court invokes whenever it decides to cancel a right as speculative, a ceremony
in which the high priests begin by intoning, "Our constitution guarantees a
right to appropriate, not a right to speculate."''
Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court today no longer cares to justify the rule on policy grounds: "It is
now too well-settled to merit elaboration that the intent to appropriate water
for a beneficial use ... cannot be based on the speculative sale or transfer of
the appropriate rights.' 32
The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently insisted that Vidler was
not new law and that it "expressly relied upon prior holdings" and "reaffirmed
[the Court'sj longstanding view."'" It is true that the prohibition of speculation
has always been inherent in prior appropriation. But, Vidle,; in requiring a
contract or an agency relationship,'3 ' went beyond what precedent required,'
126.
127.
128.
129.
(2014),

Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 394.
594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979), superscdcd by statute, COLO. R v. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(1)
as recognLized in FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840

(Colo. 1990).
130. Id.at 568.
131. Id.; see also Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1064
(Colo. 2013); Upper Yampa Water Conservancy Dist. v. Wolfe, 255 P.3d 1108, 1111 (Colo.
2011); Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Lmd Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 662 (Colo. 2011); High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
120 P.3d 710, 720 (Colo. 2005); Colo. Ground Water Coinm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 79 (Colo. 2003); Bd. of Cnty. Cmm'rs of Arapahoe v. United
States (Arapahoe J), 891 P.2d 952, 959 (Colo. 1995); Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Curtis,
733 P.2d 680, 684 (Colo. 1987); Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515, 518
(Colo. 1987); Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d
383, 388 (Colo. 1982).
132. Upper Yampa Water Conservancy Dist. v. Dequine Family L.L.C., 249 P.3d 794, 798
(Colo. 2011).
133. See, e.g., RockyMountain Power,646 P.2d at 388.
134. Vidler; 594 P.2d at 568.
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and it is apparent that the Court was more interested in creating a predictable
rule of law than in reaching a precise result in every case, especially since
"Vidler's efforts possibly went beyond mere speculation. " " The Colorado
legislature has codified Vidle;'37 and the case now stands as the first defense
against speculative appropriations. The second is the can-and-will doctrine.
IV. THE EARLY CAN-AND-WILL TEST

After an applicant takes the first step toward appropriation and satisfies
the Vidler antispeculation doctrine described above, the applicant must show
"there is a substantial probability that the applicant 'can and will' complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time."'.. Like the Vjdler
antispeculation doctrine, the Colorado legislature has codified the can-and-will
doctrine' 9 in order "to reduce speculation associated with conditional decrees
and to increase the certainty of the administration of water rights in Colorado.". Of the two doctrines, the can-and-will doctrine is "slightly more stringent."' Importantly, however, the two doctrines do separate work, and the
Colorado Supreme Court has resisted arguments -to collapse the two into a
single test.''2
The most thorough review of the can-and-will doctrine is a twenty-oneyear-old student comment by Mark E. Hamilton."' Hamilton's comment
drew the attention-and citation-of the Colorado Supreme Court"' The following Subpart provides a brief overview of Hanilton's argument and evaluates his predictions in light of the intervening twenty-one years.
A. OVERVIEW

Hamilton's comment analyzed the can-and-will doctrine in light of four
Colorado Supreme Court cases decided between 1984 and 1993-

135. Scc, e.g., Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.,
365 P.2d 273, 287 (Colo. 1961); Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 P.2d 363,
367 (Colo. 1940).
136. VidlcT, 594 P.2d at 569 (citing Bunger v. Uncompahgre Water Valley Users' Ass'n, 557
P.2d 389 (Colo. 1976), disavowed on other g.'umnds by City of Aspen v. Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1985)).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2014).
138. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Colo. 2013).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) ("No claim for a conditional water right may be
recognized or a decree therefor granted except to the extent that it is established that the waters
can be and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be
beneficially used and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and within a reasonable time.").
140. FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840 (Colo. 1990).
141. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,

708 (Colo. 1999).
142. See City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076, 1088 (Colo. 2009). But see Pagosa I,
170 11.3d 307, 320-21 (Colo. 2007) (Coals, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the ma-

jority had collapsed the distinction).
143.

Mark E. Hanilton, Comment, 7he "Can and Will" Doctrine of Colorado Rei4sed

Statute Section 37-92-305(9)(b): Changing the Nature of Conditional Water Rights5 in Colorado,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 947 (1994).
144. Seeih- note 177.
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Southeasern Coloiado Water Conservancy District v. City of Florence,"'
FIVS Lind & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife," Public Service Co. of
47
Colo1-ado v. Board of Water Works of Pueblo, Colorado,'"
and Gibbs v.
Wolf Land Co.'
In Florence, the city and town applicants sought a conditional right for
100 c.f.s. from the Arkansas River to cover their anticipated population
growth.' 4' The Court noted that "Itihe Arkansas River is severely overappropriated, mad expert witnesses testified that water might be available under the right for approximately once every 25 years.""'0 Testimony at trial suggested five to ten c.Ls. of water could meet applicants' future needs, but the
applicants were about $1 million short on financing, and their infrastructure
could only handle about 4.7 c.f.s.' The Court rejected the argument that an
applicant should not have to prove the existence of available water at the time
of the conditional right was decreed, since "the availability of water depends
upon unpredictable factors such as climate, economics and technology.""'
Hamilton, interpreting this rejection, found that Florence "held that an applicant for a conditional water right must show that unappropriated water is
available mad Hill be diverted .... [which] is not unlike the law in most other
western 'prior appropriation' states, which often requires permit applications
to demonstrate available unappropriated water. ' '5
In EWS Land & Cattle, the applicant appealed a summary judgment dismissal of a conditional storage right for water in lakes partially owned by the
state.'" The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court's determination
that FWvS could not prove that it could mad would use the water because it had
neither complete ownership of the lakes, nor permission to use the state lands
for water storage.'5 Hanilton argued that 1WS Land & Cattle "marked the
emergence of the 'can and will' doctrine as the primary deteriinant of conditional rights.... Ibyl broadenling] the interpretation of section 305(9)(b) to
require an applicant to demonstrate than an indeterminate number of hurdles
(regulatory, legal, economic, engineering, etc.) 'can and will' be surmounted. ,-"'
In Public Service Co., the water court dismissed an application for conditional rights of exchange on the Arkansas River.'" The water court, as part of
a 1984 change decree, mandated that the Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo") build an off-channel reservoir to go along with a proposed power

145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984).
795 P.2d 837, 840 (Colo. 1990).
831 P.2d 470, 476 (Colo. 1992).
856 P.2d 798, 803 (Colo. 1993).
Florence, 688 P.2d at 716.
M.
Id.at 716 n.1.
I. at 717-18.
Hamnilton, supia note 143, at 955.
FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 838 (Colo. 1990).

155. Id at 839, 841.
156. Hamnilton, supra note 143, at 958.
157. Put). Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, Colo., 831 P.2d 470, 472

(Colo. 1992).
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plant. 8 In 1987, the water court granted conditional storage rights in that
same reservoir." PSCo postponed construction of the new plant indefinitely
"[biased on many factors, including decreased demand for electrical power,
the changing economics of generating such power, and Public Utilities Coinmission regulatory standards concerning the authorization of new power generation facilities.". At the time, a PSCo executive testified that the company
still planned on building the plant, perhaps within the next ten to twenty years,
"but the decision wiouldl be based on future developments, many of which
Iwerel not within PSCo's control.'' PSCo subsequently sought to exchange
the rights for use in its existing upstream power plant."'2 The water court dismissed the application, concluding that PSCo did not intend to construct the
reservoir in accordance with the 1984 change decree, a prerequisite for the
exchange."'
On appeal, PSCo argued, amnong other things, that the water court's finding that PSCo had no present intent to construct the reservoir was in conflict
with and was a collateral attack on the 1987 storage decree.'"' The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the can-and-will doctrine applied at the time that PSCo applied for the exchange.' "IT]hat PSCo
no longer intended to construct [the reservoir is not inconsistent with a finding that it did not have such an intent at the time it secured the 1987 storage
decree.'.. For Hanilton, the Public Services Co. court used the can-and-will
doctrine to invalidate a conditional decree instead of the Vidler antispeculation doctrine or diligence doctrine, thus "widenjing] the reach of the 'can and
will' doctrine
and establishling] its use as a catch-all objection to large pro67
Jects.'
In Gibbs v. Wolf Land Co., the water court granted a conditional water
right for a well located on the protestor's property."" The Colorado Supreme
Court affinred the decision, holding that the applicant could rely on the private right of condemnation to meet the can-and-will statute." The Gibbs
court distinguished itself from IV/S Lmd & Cattle Co. on the grounds that
"FWS is premised on the fact that under no circumstances, absent the consent
of the DOW, could the applicant have obtained access to the [protestor's]
lands.""' Thus, for Hamilton, Gibbs "retained the scope of the 'can and will'
doctrine's broad inquiry enunciated in previous cases while limiting the preponderance standard to a legal impossibility test ....

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.at.
473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 4 7 6.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id.
Hamilton, supra note 143, at 961.
856 P.2d 798, 799 (Colo. 1993).
Id. at 799, 803.
Id. at 802 (emphasis in original).
Hamilton, supra note 143, at 962. But see intiha notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
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From these cases, Hamilton drew two primary conclusions. First, "the
can and will doctrine has substantially broadened the scope of the permissible
72
inquiry a water court can make when adjudicating a conditional water right."1
Second, because of this broadened inquiry, the can-and-will doctrine has
made Colorado water law resemble the permit systems of other western
states.
B. ANALYSIS
While Hamilton's comment was accurate and admirable at the time, the
Colorado Supreme Court has stepped away from some of his foundational
principles, and his predictions have not come to fruition.
First, the Colorado Supreme Court has not used the can-and-will doctrine
as a judicial permit system. Hamilton relied on Florence and a decision by
the water court in the Union Park Reservoir litigation to argue that courts
should take into account other conditional rights in determining whether there
was sufficient unappropriated water in the strean.' 4 Hamilton argued that
"Il]ailure to consider existing conditional decrees would be tantamount to disregarding adjudicated property rights. The consideration of senior conditional
rights by water courts is comparable to the power of most water permitting
agencies in other Western states.""' The Colorado Supreme Court rejected
this argument a year later in Board of'County Colnmissioners v. United States
(Arapahoe/), in which the Court held that senior conditional rights were not
to be considered in determining the amount of unappropriated water available.' The Court, in reaching this result, relied on the policies of maximum
utilization or maximum beneficial use. '
Second, it is not apparent that the can-and-will doctrine has become "the
primary determinant of conditional rights."'
Rather, courts have used the
can-and-will doctrine in conjunction with the Vidler antispeculation doctrine.
In some cases, an applicant will lose on both doctrines.'
In others, each doctine will do independent work-for instance, in a case of competing conditional claims, one party might lose on the antispeculation doctrine while the
other loses on the can-and-will doctrine.'' It seems that the can-and-will doctrine has become a secondary inquiry, applied when the Court senses that
there is some speculative intent: "ITihe 'can and will' requirement should not
be applied rigidly to prevent beneficial uses where an applicant otherwise satis-

172. Hamilton, supra note 143, at 968.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 967 nn.124-26.
175. Id. at 967
176. 891 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Colo. 1995).
177. Id. at 961-62. Compare id. at 961 (majority favorably citing Hamilton's comment),
with id. at 976-77 n.27 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (responding directly to Hamilton's comment
by rejecting the argument that the can-and-will doctrine was a judicial version of other states'
pennitting systems mad noting that such a system was purview of the legislature).
178. Id. at 962.
179. See Hanilton, supranote 143, at 958.
180. E.g., PagosaI,170 P.3d 307, 309-10 (CQolo. 2007).
181. E.g., Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P. 3d 1056, 1059, 1062
(Colo. 2013).
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lies the legal standard of establishing a nonspeculafive intent to appropriate for
a beneficial use. ' 'n
Third, the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the canand-will doctrine is a legal impossibility test. In TI',S -uid& Catde Co., the
Court held that FWS could not satisfy the can-and-will requirement because it
could not legally obtain access to the land necessary to complete the appropriation.'83 This issue arose later in Gibbswhen the applicant sought conditional
rights to a well located on the protestor's land. ' The protestor argued that
Gibbs had failed the can-and-will test because Gibbs had not established an
unrestricted right of access across the private property." Both the water court
and the Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Gibbs
had safisfied the can-and-will Lest by "relylingl on the potential right of private
condenmation."'.
Front this, Hamilton concluded that Gibbs established a
legal impossibility test-"Idthat is to say that the 'can and will' doctrine should
not inhibit issuance of a conditional decree unless it is a legal impossibility that
the water will be applied to a beneficial use in the future
(e.g., a necessary
7
permit cannot be obtained, under any circumstances).'1
While Gibbs remains good law, the court has emphasized that it should
be interpreted as a factor in detemining whether applicants have satisfied the
can-and-will test. In Vermilion Ranch, the water court had held that "the application should be denied under the 'can and will' requirement 'only if the
impediments make it impossible' for the applicant to complete the appropriation. ... ." The water court erred, however, for the proper test "is a balancing
test that turns on several factors .... In Civ ofi3ack Hawk v. City of'Cemnua,' '
the Court held that Black Hawk satisfied the can-and-will test even after Central City had passed a nonbinding general resolution that barred third parties
front using its property for water projects."' The Court in Vermillion Rich
interpreted City of[Black Hawk as a factor case: "We based our holding on
the lbtct that the lack of current access to property is not typically dispositive of
whether the 'can and will' test is satisfied, and on the water court's inding that
Black Hawk had satisfied all the other requirements of the 'can and will' statute.". Thus, "Iprecedentl dolesi not suggest that a court has no basis to deny
an application Linder the 'can and will' requirement unless the impediments
make the project impossible to complete.'"" "In other words, absence of a
182.

City of Thornton v. BiJou Irigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 43 (Colo. 1996); see also City of

Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Colo. 2009); lagosa 1, 170 P.3d, at 322 (Eid, J.,
specially concurring); City of Black Hawk v. City of Central, 97 P.3d 951, 957 (Colo. 2004);
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Conservatory Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 708 & n.3 (Colo.
1999).
183. FNVS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 839, 840 (Colo. 1990).
184. Gibbs v. Woll Land Co., 856 P.2d 798, 799 (Colo. 1993).
185.

See id. at 800.

186.

M. at 803.

187.

Hamilton, supa note 143, at 962 n.95.

188. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raliopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1070 (Colo. 2013).
189. Id.at 1071.
190. 97 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
191.

Id. at 958.

192.
193.

Vermillion Ranch, 307 P.3d at. 1071 (citing Cin, of Black Hawk, 97 P.3d at 951,958).
1i.
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final denial of access is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for satisfaction
of the can and will requirement."'. Thus, applicants have failed the can-andwill requirement when authorization was possible, but would have required
congressional
approval" or when the proposed use was possible but unlike96
ly.'
The can-and-will test has substantially more leeway than Hamilton predicted from the early cases. Courts today have the option to emphasize either
the Vi/idler doctrine or the can-and-will doctrine and have the ability to cancel
conditional rights based on a number of factors. This has developed into the
substantial probability test.
V. THE MODERN CAN-AND-WILL DOCTRMhNE
A. SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY
The most important development in the can-and-will doctrine since Hamilton's comment is the development of the substantial probability test, first articulated in 1995 in Arapidpoe 1." For the Arapahoe I court, the substantial
probability test was a more precise articulation of the can-and-will statute and
was inherent in the traditional doctrine that applicants should pursue conditional rights with diligence.' Under the substantial probability test, "the applicant bears the burden of proving, through evidence, a substantial probability
that the project can and will be completed, with diligence and within a reasonable time, and ...whether an applicant has demonstrated that it has met the
'can and will' requirement is a balancing test that examines several relevant
factors."" Because the future is uncertain, courts must evaluate evidence in
terms of factors instead of elements.' The presence of future contingencies is
a nondispositive factor that courts must consider together with all the facts and
194. City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3(1 1076, 1085 (Colo. 2009).
195. Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d
1265, 1278-79 (Colo. 2006).
196. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325,

344 (Colo. 2000).
197. Arapahoe 1, 891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo. 1995) ("The 'can and will' statute was intended
to prevent approval of a conditional water right that cannot or will not be completed with diligcnce and within a reasonable timc. Therefore, to acquire a conditional water right decree, an
applicant must establish that there is a substantial probability that within a reasonable time water
can and will be appropriated and put to a beneficial use. The applicant must prove, as a
threshold requirement, that water is available based upon river conditions existing at the time of
the application, in priority, in sufficient quantities and on sufficiently frequent occasions, to enable the applicant to complete the appropriation withl diligence and within a reasonable time.
When river conditions existing at the tine of the application for a conditional water right decree
prevent completion of the proposed appropriation, there is no substantial probability that the
project %ill be completed with diligence within a reasonable time. Conditional water rights under which no diversions have been made, or are being made, should not be considered, and
absolute water rights should be considered to the extent of historical diversions rather than on
the assumption that maximum utilization of the decreed anount is the amount used. Our construction of the 'can and will' statute is in accord with our prior case law, with the intent of the
intent of the General Assembly, and with the policy of nixximuini beneficial use of water.").
198. See id.
199. Vermnillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1071-72 (Colo.
2013).
200. Arapahoc 1, 891 P.2d at 961 n.9.
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circumstances of each particular case.2'
cludes:

A nonexhaustive list of factors in-

(1) economic feasibility; (2) the status of requisite permit applications and
other required governmental approvals; (3) expenditures made to develop
the appropriation; (4) the ongoing conduct of engineering and environmental
studies; (5) the design and construction of facilities; and (6) the nature and
extent of land holdings and contracts demonstrating the water demand and
beneficial uses which the conditional right is to serve when perfected."2
While the substantial probability test renmins the standard test for the canand-will statute, some of the most important cases in the last fifteen years deal
with how the can-and-will statute interacts with other policy decisions made by
the Colorado General Assembly.
B. RECENT CAN-AND-WILL CASES
This Subpart outlines some of the most important can-and-will cases of
the last fifteen years. Part \I evaluates these cases more fully.
1. The Oil Shale Cases
Over the course of 1999 and 2000, the Colorado Supreme Court decided
three cases concerning conditional water rights for oil shale development in
northwestern Colorado. All of these cases were appeals from hexennial diligence findings.
In MunicipdSubdl'tici, Northern Colorado Water ConservanvDi tic
v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., ' the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water
court's finding that Chevron had demonstrated reasonable diligence in developing its conditional rights."°4 Chevron's conditional rights were dated in the
early 1950s but were still not absolute; the Subdistrict argued that "Chevron
intendled] to hold these water rights for over 100 years without exercising reasonable diligence and that such inaction constituteId] unlawful speculation in
conditional water rights. ''1 °1 Chevron had deferred its oil shale development
after oil prices dropped in the 1980s and its number of employees dropped
from fifty or sixty to only one. ' Further, Chevron had not started construction of any necessary facilities, even though its conditional rights were fortyfive years old."' Chevron had spent $1.5 million over the six-year diligence
period, but "nearly one-third was spent on litigation unrelated to perfecting the
conditional water rights.""° For these and other reasons, the Subdistrict argued that Chevron had failed to meet its statutory burden of showing a steady
effort to complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient

201. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 43-44 (Colo. 1996)
202. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huev, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. 1997).
203. 986 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1999).
204.

Id. at 920.

205. Id.
at 922.
206. Id.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
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manner.2"

The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the Subdistrict's claim and affirmed the water court's finding of diligence because Chevron's efforts, albeit
minimal, were sufficient to demonstrate "a steady application of effort to
complete its appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient manner"
given that the production of oil from shale was not then economically feasible.2'0
The Subdistrict's final argument was that the water court had misapplied
the "current economic conditions" limitation in section 37-92-301 (4)(c), which
provided that:
neither cunent economic conditions beyond the control of the applicant
which adversely affect the feasibility of perfecting a conditional water right or
the proposed use of water from a conditional water right nor the fact that one
or more governmental permits or approvals have not been obtained shall be
considered sufficient to deny a diligence application, so long as other facts
and circumstances which show diligence are present." '
It contended that the court should not have relied on the fact that the current
state of the economy made shale oil production economically unfeasible in
considering whether Chevron's efforts constituted reasonable diligence because that allowed Chevron to delay the project indefinitely.'
Again, the
court rejected this argument, noting that not only should the water court consider the statute but that such interpretation was implicit in the case law that
established that economic feasibility was one of the factors to be considered in
a diligence proceeding."'
Chevron Shale was clarified and expanded four months later in Municipal
Subdistnct, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Distaict v. OXY USA,
Inc. "' For the second time, the Colorado Supreme Court affirned the water
court's findings of diligence. The water court held, and the Court agreed, that
the can-and-will test applies even during the hexennial review proceedingsthat is, the diligence proceedings are not merely backward-looking, evaluating
how the applicant has moved toward beneficial use, but require an inquiry into whether the applicant has a substantial probability of putting the water to
beneficial use. 2 '
Even though OXY admitted before the water court that it could not extract the oil shale because low oil prices made the project economically infeasible, and that it was unlikely to extract any shale until oil prices increased or
the government subsidized the project, the Court held that OXY had met its
209.

Id. at 921.

210. Id. at 923. The minimal efforts were activities within the following categories: "planning
for a diversion facility, planning a damn on Roan Creek, planning for pipeline facilities, preparing environmental baseline studies, preparing a detailed master planning document for Chevron's Parachute Creek Unit, and participating in miscellaneous activities related to the conditional water rights such as litigation, research projects, and studies." Id. at 921.
211. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4)(c) (2014).

212. Chevrion Shale, 986 P.2d at 923.
213. Id. at 924 (citing Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (1997)).
214. 990 P.2d 701 (1999).
215. Id. at 707-08.
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burden."6 OXY had spent $5,052,235 during the six-year period, including
drilling natural gas wells that provided data on oil shale reserves and income to
offset the cost of maintaining the oil shale assets, and had conducted some
other activities. 7 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Chevron Shale and emphasized its deference to the legislature: "ITIhe General Assembly has made a
policy decision that the inleasibility of development of oil shale under current
economic conditions should not cause applicants like OXY to lose their conditional rights. We are bound by that policy determination."'
The Colorado Supreme Court decided the third of the oil shale cases the
following spring. In Municipld Subcltrict, Northern Coloraido Watier Consevucy J)istrict v. Getty Oil Exploi-ation Co.,29 the Court once again upheld
the water court's finding of reasonable diligence.2 Like Chevon and OXY,
Getty had spent some money and some resources in developing its rights.'
The result was foregone: noting section 37-92-301(4)(c), Chev'on Shade, and
OXY USA, the Court held that Getty had been sufficiently diligent to retain
economic factors makits conditional rights, "despite the presence of adverse
22
..
ing the project's ultimate completion date uncertain.
2. Pagosa
In 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court embarked on "a new era of judi'
cial scrutiny of conditional water rights applications by municipalities." ' Mu-

216.
217.

Id. at 705.
Id. These other activitics included tie following:

1) completing technological and economic fcasibilitv studies for the property'; 2) attempting to solicit financial partners for the project; 3) participating in the Colorado
River Project on Threatened mid Endargered Species, the Colorado River Siniulation Model Project (CORSIM), the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, Oil
Shale Committee, ard the Colorado Wiater Congress' Colorado river Project on Water Quality Standards; ard 4) gathering data regarding water supply. OXY incuned
additiond expenses for salaries, engineering fees, legal fees, and litigation costs to protect its water rights.

I.
218. Id.at 708.
219. 997 P.2d 557 (Colo. 2000).
220. Id. at 564.
221. Id.at 563-64 ("Although the rock barrage was never constructed, the water court found
that the following work in three site-specitic areas was pertborned at an approximate cost of
$325,000. In regard to tie diversion facility, a preliminary design and cost estimate was prepared; geologic Field conditions were investigated; planned specifications and cost estimates
were prepared; an existing permit was amended to include tie proposed rock barrage; Colorado River morphology was reviewed; and monitoring and recording of Colorado River water levels was conducted for use in designi work and operation studies. In regard to tie Roan Creek
dan, geological and geotechnical investigations of fie dam foundation, outlet works, and spillways were performed, as well as investigation of cmtbankment borrow areas for the dam. In
regard to e pipeline facilities, a preliminary desigli aid cost estimate for a pumping plan were
performed; pipeline ahernative aligmient studies were performed; gcotechnical invesligations of
alternate pipeline routes were performed; and cost estimates of the alternative pipeline alignments were revised based on the geotechnical investigations.").
222. Id. at 564.
223. Derek L. Turner, Comment, IPagosa Area Water & Smitation District v. Trout Unlim-

ited and an Ant-speculation Doctrine lr a New Era of Water Supply Plnnnhg,82 U. CoLo. L.
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nicipalities had traditionally received significant leeway from both the courts",
and the legislature." In 1996, the Court held that municipalities did not enjoy
complete immunity from speculation challenges."' While a municipality can
appropriate without firn contractual relations or agency relationships, as required by Vidler, a municipality can only conditionally appropriate an amount
that is "consistent with the municipality's reasonably anticipated requirements
based on substantiated projects of future growth." 7
The Colorado Supreme Court went even farther in Pagosa Area Water
Ditrict v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa4."2 Though the water court had upheld
extensive conditional appropriations by the small Western Slope town of Pagosa Springs, " the Court held that the water court had failed to make sufficient findings that Pagosa Springs had satisfied both the antispeculation doctrine and the can-and-will statute. " ' In doing so, the Court established, for the
first time, a series of elements that a government water supply agency had to
demonstrate:
(1) what is a reasonable water supply planning project; (2) what are the
substantiated population projections based on a normal rate of growth for that
period; and (3) what amount of available unappropriated water is reasonably
necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the
governmental agen2 3
cy for the planning period, above its current water supply. '
The Court disagreed about the length of the planning period involved. In
Bijou, the Court had upheld a fifty-year planning period, which the Court
used as a model in Pagosa L2"2 The majority noted, "Although the fifty year
planning period we approved in Bijou is not a fixed upper limit, and each case
depends on its own facts, the water court should closely scrutinize a governmental agency's claim lor a planning period that exceeds fifty years." Three
justices disagreed. Justice Coats argued that the approval of a fifty-year planning period eliminated the reasonable time requirement of the can-and-will
statute, and Justice Eid, joined by Justice Rice, argued that the majority had
imposed a mandatory fifty-year cap on development in the state.tm The full
effects of these questions are still unclear and are discussed in the following
Part.

REV. 639, 668 (2011). Or, in more moderate terms, the court made "further... relinements"
to the municipal exception to the antispeculation doctrine. Sarah A. Klahn, 2A CowO. PRAc.,
Anti-S"peculation Doctrine§ 76:8 (2013).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
225. See Cow. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2014) (excluding municipalities from the Vidler
requirements).
226. City of Thornton v. Bijou In. Co., 926 P.2d 1, 38 (Colo. 1996).
227. Id. at 39.
228. 170 P.3d 307, 309-10 (Colo. 2007).
229. Id. at 309.
230. Id. at 309-10.
231. Id.
232. Seeid. at315-17.
233. Id.at 317.
234. Id. at 320-21 (Coats, J., concun-ing in the judgment only).
235. Id. at 322 (Eid, J., specially concurring).
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VI. DISCUSSION
To summarize the preceding discussion: The prohibition against speculation is deeply entrenched in Colorado water law, and, while there are strong
economic arguments to allow speculation in certain circumstances, these reasons will not be persuasive before the court. The most powerful justification
for the prohibition against speculation is that water should be distributed to
those who will put the water to beneficial use-that is, water rights should not
be tied tp to the detriment of others. This means that courts should study the
speculative effects of a project as readily as the speculative intent of the appropriator. This Part argues that the can-and-will doctrine, as currently applied,
has led to significant speculative effects. To curb these effects, this Part argues
that the legislature should adopt a statutory time limit for conditional rights.
A. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CAN-AND-WILL DOCTRINE

It has been argued that the combination of the Vilerantispeculation doctrine and the can-and-will doctrine has been successful in curbing speculation." But this is only true in the very narrow sense of prohibiting the treatment of water as a commodity to invest in. This Subpart argues that the
current doctrine has been ineffective at achieving the policy that grounds the
antispeculation doctrine to begin with: the distribution of water to potential
beneficial users.
The oil shale cases discussed above-Chevron Shale, OXY USA, and
Getty Ol--demonstrate the problems with the Vidler antispeculation doctrine
and the can-and-will doctrine of section 37-92-305(9)(b). In each of those
three cases, the appropriator was a private party appropriating water for itself,
so Vidlci; which applies to private parties only when they are appropriating for
another use, ' never applied. Thus, the only check on the companies was the
can-and-will doctrine."
The oil shale cases stand not just for a point of law, but for an empirical
fact as well. Each of those three cases demonstrates an instance in which a
single user was able to retain conditional water rights that were half a century
old, even when the rights had not been put to beneficial use and the user had
no intention of putting the rights to use within the foreseeable future." Conditional rights for oil shale have priorities that date back to 1936," ' and the holders of those rights still have not put them to beneficial use.
The oil shale cases are perhaps the highest profile example of' this, but
they are not the only example. " Conditional rights are common in every ba-

236. See Hunilton, supi-a note 143, at 948-50, 961.
237. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566,
568-69 (Colo. 1979).
238. See Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevon Shale Oil Co., 986
P.2d 918, 922-23 (Colo. 1999); Mon. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY
USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 705, 707-09 (1999); M1n. Subdist.,

N. Colo. Water

Dist. v. Getty Oil Exploration Co., 997 P.2d 557, 564-65 (Colo. 2000).
239. See Chevron Shde, 986 P.2d at 923.
240. MACDONNELL, s1pa note 12, at 46 tbI.B- 1.
241. And the point here is not to demonize the oil shale companies.
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sin in the state, including ilTigation, municipal, and industrial uses.2 ' Charles
Podolak and Martin Doyle recently demonstrated how extensive conditional
claims are, finding that conditional claims equal 61% of the amount of perfected rights and that some of these claims are nearly a century old. '3 They
found that, at the end of 2012, 92% of conditional rights (by amount of flow)
were older than six years, and 23% were older than thirty years.! " They also
reported that, in the last thirty years, the primary reduction in conditional
rights was due to abandonment and not to perfection." In other words, not
only are conditional rights holders hanging onto these righLs for a long time,
they are not putting them to benelicial use.
1. The Can-and-Will Doctrine Has Been Diluted
It is hard to say that the Colorado Supreme Court got the oil shale cases
wrong as a matter of law. Because section 37-92-301(4)(c) prohibits the water
court from denying an application solely because economic conditions have
affected the feasibility of the project when the applicant proves other diligence," ' the Court could not consider the economic infeasibility of the oil
shale project.
But these cases strain credulity. The Court accepted the economic feasibility argument, noting that "ItIhis interpretation has been implicit in [the]
caselaw that sets forth the requirements for an ad hoc finding of reasonable
diligence.
But this is an important doctrinal shift: while economic feasibility
has always been important, commentators traditionally interpreted it as a factor for c'mceling conditional rights rather than as a tool to delay development."' This is why Hamilton predicted that the can-and-will statute would be
such a powerful tool for courts,t9 and earlier cases supported this proposition. °
Furthernore, the current application of the can-and-will statute is at odds
with the fundamental purpose of conditional rights. Conditional rights should
protect appropriators during the construction of large-scale, long-tern projects- Taussigand Metropolitan Suburban illustrate this well-rather than allow
companies to choose when to put the water to beneficial use. This was not
the case in the oil shale cases. In Chevron Shale, the company had reduced
its entire operation to one person;s' in OXY USA, the company had admitted
that it was not immediately planning to extract oil." In Gelly Oil, the Colora-

242.
243.
244.

Podolak & Doyle, supra note 19, at 14, 25 tbl.2.
Id/ at 14.
Id. at 27.

245. Id. at 28.
246. Coio. REV. SrAT. § 37-92-301(4)(c) (2014).
247. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., 986 P.2d
918, 924 (Colo. 1999).
248. Klahn, supra note 223, § 76:7.
249. See Hamilton, supra note 143, at 960-6 1.
250. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works, 831 P.2d 470, 478-79 (Colo.
1992).
251. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., 986 P.2d
918, 922-23 (Colo. 1999).
252. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,
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do Supreme Court seemed to shrug its shoulders: even though "the project's
ultimate completion date [was] uncertain," Getty had satisfied the can-and-will
test." 3 The Court concluded:
As in OXY, the water court in the instant case found that the oil shale project
is technically feasible given current technology, thus demonstrating that Getty
"can" complete the project. The water court also found that Getty "will go
forward with the project when it becomes economically feasible." Therefore,
we hold that the water court properly interpreted and applied section 37-92201 (4)(c) to the facts of the instant case.
Getty was able to appropriate the water but chose not to because it would be
unprofitable. Under this interpretation, the reasonable diligence and can-andwill tests become effectively meaningless: if a court is going to protect conditional rights under the can-and-will test, then the court cannot at the same time
require that the appropriator take steps to put the water to beneficial use.
When both the appropriator and the court know that development will be
postponed until the market changes," any work done for a diligence proceeding will be token construction." As such, appropriators have been able to
hoard priorities in a way that is reminiscent of other resources that are not limited by speculation prohibitions."7 Consequently, the notion that the antispeculation doctrine provides a "judicial 'check' on speculative transactions that
adversely affect third parties and ecological needs by depriving them of water"28 is largely rhetorical.
Holders of conditional rights initially seem different from other hoarders.
While timber companies once hoarded vast forests and waited for the price of
timber to increase," the holders of conditional water rights can maintain their
conditional rights until the project becomes economically feasible and, as
such, do not share a speculative intent. But, as discussed above, the prohibition against speculation only makes sense as a prohibition against speculative

705 (Colo. 1999).
253. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Getty Oil Exploration Co., 997
P.2d 557, 564 (Colo. 2000).

254. Id.at 565.
255. Se also OXY USA, 990 P.2d at 705 ("OXY admitted before the water court that it
currently cannot extract the oil shale because low oil prices make the project economically infeasible. Until oil prices rise or the government subsidizes the project, OXY is unlikely to extract any shale.").
256. Cf supiatext accompanying notes 54-56.
257. The experience of the Pacific Northwest, where a select few timber companies gained a
monopoly of the timber reserves and held them speculatively, is illustrative. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE &

LABOR,

BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, THE LUMiER

IN)USTRY:

STANDING

TIMBER, at xxii (1913) ("The largest holders are cutting little of their timber. They thus reserve

to themselves those incalculable profits which are still to accrue with the growth of the country,
the diminishing of timber supply, and the further concentration and control thereof. Many of
tie very men who are protesting against conservation and tie national forest system because of
the 'tying up' of natural resources are themselves deliberately tying them up far more efiectively
for private gain. The fact that mature tiiber is thus withheld from use is clear evidence that
great additional prolits are expected to accrue through further increase in value.") [hereinafter
U.S. BUREAU OF CORPORATIONSi.
258. Zelliner, supa note 26, at 998.

259. See U.S.

BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS,

supra note 257, at xxii.
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effects, not intent." The effect on potential beneficial users is the same, regardless of whether the water is being held until its price increases or indelinitely and until the project becomes feasible.
2. Colorado Water Law Has Created Basin-Wide Monopoly Without

Beneficial Use.
It has been said that "Itihere is no Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil or General
Electric of the water world.
",," Agricultural users make up the vast majority
of water users, and those rights are distributed among hundreds of thousands
of individual users."' Single users are permitted to appropriate and own its
much water as they can put to beneficial use, which may give them control
over a single streamn or other localized area."' While some buyers may entertain thoughts of vast accumulations of water rights,"6 ' large-scale monopolies
are unlikely to control water rights today.'t
But the ExxonMobil of the water world is ExxonMobil.
Localized control is not a monopoly in an economic sense,6 but rights holders may be able
to hoard priorities to the detriment of potential benelicial users." This is what
the Pagosa I court had in mind when it addressed the "monopolist pitalls" '
of speculation: the concern should not be on large-scale monopoly, but it
should be on whether a user has unfairly driven out any other potential beneficial users..2 As long as water is put to beneficial use, the law must tolerate
monopoly. This is the return to Locke implicit in Colorado law. For Locke,
proper appropriation took something away from the common property, but
this did not harm the public, because the act of applying labor developed the
resource, thus bettering humankind as a whole' by effecting an efficient allo"

260. See supra Part II.C.
261. Zellmer, supra note 26, at 1023; see adso Neuman, supia note 20, at 969 ("ITilhere is no
Microsoft® of western water.").
262. Se Zelhner, supra note 26, at 1023.
263. Neuman, supra note 20, at 969.
264. See Zellmer, supra note 26, at 1000 (2008) ("IT. Boonel Pickens has been acquiring
more land overlying the [Ogalallal Aquifer [in Texasl so that he can l)ump and sell as much as
200,000 acre-feet per year of water to one of the state's large metropolital centers. Pickens' owni
website proclaims that his company ... is the largest private holder of groundwater rights in the
United States.").
265. See Neuman, supra note 20, at 969.
266. This point is not to single out ExxonMobil, but it is worth mentioning that ExxonMobil
is the only remaining major oil company with federal leases in northwestern Colorado since
Shell and Chevron left. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Shell Quits Colorado Oil.Shale E/lirt, HousTON
CHRON., Sept. 26, 2013, at 3. ExxonMobil also holds more conditional water rights (in c.f.s.) in
both the Colorado and 'White River Basins than any other oil company. See MAcDONNELI.,
supra note 12, at xiv, 19-21.
267. .See Zellner, supranote 26, at 1023.
268. See generally Podalak & Doyle, supia note 19, at 16-17 (discussing purchasing senior
conditional rights as a possible way for junior users to gain certainty).
269. Pagosa1, 170 P.3d 307, 313 (Colo. 2007).
270. Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d 1265,
1277 (Colo. 2006).
271. LOCKE, supra note 28, § 37; see also Allen v. Petrick, 222 P. 451, 452 (Mont. 1924)
("The use of water in Montana is vital to the prosperity of our people. Its use, even by an individual, to irrigate a frmn, is so much a contributing factor to the welfhue of the state that the
people, in adopting the Constitution, declared it to be a public use."); id. at 453 ("It is to the
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cation of resourcesY' Presumably, Coloradans are better off27" when users put
water to beneficial use, expressed in any number of ways: jobs, local agricultural, cultural identity. This is the point of the mxximum utilization policy.
3. The Extensive Number of Conditional Rights Creates Uncertainty for
Water Users.
Statewide, Podalak and Doyle discovered that 88% of conditional rights
are abandoned or perfected after the initial six-year diligence period. " ' After
that, 30% of perfected rights took longer than twenty-four years to perfect, and
5% took longer than seventy-two years.17 Twenty-four percent of rights that
were eventually abandoned took longer than twenty-four years to be abancloned, and 4% took longer than seventy-two years.'
While conditional rights provide their holder with certainty of seniority,
the conditional right also creates uncertainty for users farther clown the priority list. 77 When senior rights remain conditional, it effectively gives the junior
appropriator a much higher priority. But if those senior rights are ever put to
beneficial use, then the junior right will be bumped down the chain. Of
course, this is how the system is supposed to work, but the problem is the uncertainly created when the junior user cannot predict when it will lose its deliveries, especially when conditional rights take so long to be perfected or
7
abandoned.1
A junior user who is behind decreed appropriations can plan
for future deliveries and likely predict with reasonable accuracy how much water it will have available for the coming year. ' But the junior user behind
conditional rights cannot predict il, or when, those conditional rights will mature. Not only does this create planning uncertainties, but junior users will also lose any investments they make if the conditional rights are perfected.' A
rights holder who is hoarding priorities for a single large-scale project may be
unlikely to sell off those rights to junior users, making market solutions ineffective."'
The corollary of this is that the system leads to perpetual litigation. In order to guard against this uncertainty and to protect their investments, junior

interest of the public that every acre of land in this state susceptible to irrigation shall be irigat-

cd.").
272. Stevens, supra notc 29, at 264.
273. Gencrdlv ann broadly speaking, that is. This is not to den' iml)ortant environmental
consequences.
274. Podalak & )oyle, supra note 19, at 28.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See generallv Podalak & Doyle, supna note 19.
278. See id.
279. That is, even though precipitation is highly variable in Colorado, there are certain repeatable events that provide some measure of consistency. After runoff peaks, the flow of Colorado's rivers gradually decreases over tie summer, and users have some idea when die senior
rights will put a call on tie river. The variability of precipitation changes the base levels of this
process-dat is, runoff may begin earlier or later, may last shorter or longer-but the overall

trend will remain the same.
280. See Pagosa 1, 170 P.3d 307, 316 (Colo. 2007).
281. See Podalak & Doyle, supra note 19, at 29-30 (discussing purchasing senior conditional
rights as a possible way for junior users to gain certainty).

IVA TER 1A WREVIEW

Vo)lurne 18

users must protest every hexennial diligence finding, all in the hope that they
can knock out some of the senior conditional rights. 2 As the oil shale cases
show, the current substantial-probability doctrine makes it very difficult lor users to successfully challenge these rights.
B. WHY PAGOSA GOT IT RIGHT
The judicial scrutiny of municipalities in Pagosa isfar removed from the
7
deference in She.
riff Municipalities do need flexibility to plan for growth,'"
and some have criticized PagosaIfor the restraints that it imposed on municipalities.' Because courts are generally reluctant to substitute their judgment
in other municipal decisions, such as zoning, annexations, rate making, and
condemnations, they should likewise exercise caution in interfering in municipalities' water use decisions.'
But this argument only makes sense if water is like other resources and
water planning decisions are like other municipal decisions. Since the policy
of the state constitution, the courts, and the legislature is that water is a unique
resource, then it is appropriate for courts to hold municipalities to some form
of an antispeculation doctrine, for the impact of speculative appropriationsthat is, hoarding priorities-is the same whether the holder of that priority is
private or public. Indeed, Pagosa Springs' very intent was to hoard priorities. " For that reason, the Pagosa I court got it right as a matter of policy,
since "Itihe need for flexibility, of course, does not relieve a governmental entity from demonstrating that the conditional decree it seeks is non-speculative
and ineets the 'can and will' requirement."'
The full fall-out of Pagosa I has yet to be determined, and several questions remain uianswered.
First, one commentator has raised-but has not answered-the question of
whether the Pagosa doctrine should extend to private appropriators. " Because the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly noted that it derived the doctrine from law that applies to both public and private appropriators, the argument goes, a broad reading of the Pagosa doctrine may extend to private
appropriators as well."
It is unlikely that the Pagosa doctrine will extend to private appropriators
as a matter of law. The fifty-year planning period in Pagosa serves the same
function as a normal application for a conditional water right. If a private applicant wants to apply for a conditional right, they must apply for a certain
282. See Pagosa I, 170 P.3d at 316-17; see alsoJan G. Laitos, 7he Elikct of Water Law on
the Development of Oil ShAe, 58 U.I).ENy. Lj. 751, 757 (1981); Podalak & Doyle, supra note
19, at 30.
283.
284.
285.

See text accompanying supra notes 104-07.
Zellmer, supra note 26, at 1029.
Funk & Arnold, supni note 62, at 312.

286.

Id.

287. See Pagosa I, 170 P.3d at 321 (Coats, J., concuning in the judgment only) (noting that
testimony had made clear that the conditional rights were sought only "as a bid to preempt intervening appropriations for more immediate needs").
288. Id at 322 (Eid,J., specially concuring).
289. Turner, supranote 223, at 670.
290. Seeid.at669-70.
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quantity of water. The reasonable planning period in PagosaIdoes the sane
thing hy trying to quantify, a certain amount of water while attempting to provide municipalities the flexibility they need to develop. In this sense, the
planning period in Pigosa is a compromise position, and, while it is a significant departure from early cases like SheriI, the application of some constraints on municipalities is consistent with the policies underlying the antispeculation doctrine as a whole.
Second, as Justice Coats noted in concurrence, the Pagosa /court seemed
to collapse the requirements of the antispeculation doctrine with the can-andwill doctrine. " ' Justice Coats argued that imposing a planning period requirement overlooked the reasonable time requirement of the can-and-will statute
and would "encourage governmental agencies and water courts alike to fie up
the state's water resources with conditional decrees long beyond the time reasonably required to complete a particular project and actually put the resulting
water to a beneficial use.".. His test would be simply that "the 'can and will'
statute requires completion within a reasonable time, in light of the legal, engineering, and economic circumstances of the project. " Even though Justice
Coats would have canceled Pagosa Springs' conditional rights for ftilure to
meet this standard, :" his proposed test falls victim to the problems discussed
above-that, as a matter of flact, conditional rights are allowed to continue indefinitely.
C. A WAY FORWARD
The most significant relorm that the Colorado legislature could make is to
establish an expiration (late on conditional rights. Utah, for instance, has already established a time limit on how long an appropriator has to put the water to beneficial use. Initially, appropriators are given a seven-year time framne
to put the water to beneficial use,"9 " but this time fraune can be extended on
two conditions: not only must the applicant show reasonable due diligence or
a reasonable cause for delay, but the extension cammot be granted after fifty
years from the date the application is approved.' Further, while the Pagosa
doctrine represented a significant change in Colorado,"7 Utah has a codified
version of the doctrine, which provides, "The reasonable future water requirement of the public is the amount of water needed in the next 40 years by
the persons within the public water supplier's projected service area based on
projected population growth or other water use demand."' Utah solves tie
problem highlighted in Metropolitan Suburbum-that is, that massive projects
may take a significant amnount of time-by allowing public water suppliers and
wholesale electrical cooperatives to extend beyond the fifty-year deadline if
they meet certain requirements and have constructed or have made substantial

291. Pagosa, 170 P.3d at 320 (Coats,j., concun'ing injudgment only).
292. Id.
293. Id at 321.
294. Id.
295. See UTAH CoDE ANN. § 73-1-4(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2014).
296. Id. § 73-3-12(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
297. .Scc supra Pmt VI.B.
298. UTAH Comi; ANN. § 73-1-4(2)()(i).
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expenditures to construct the works necessary to put the water to beneficial
use.' Utah has made the policy decision to use statutory authority to ensure
that water hoarding is limited." Utah's reasoning is unsurprising in light of the
preceding discussion, but what is surprising is that Colorado courts have made
the same types of pronouncements while hoarding is allowed to continue. °
Other states have fashioned statutory deadlines that account for problems
that might be encountered in the development of a project. While Idaho requires applicants to put water to full beneficial use within five years from the
(late of approval, it also grants certain extensions." For instance, the law will
not penalize an applicant if litigation holds up the project.
So long as the
applicant "is proceeding diligently and in good faith," the department of water
resources will extend the permit to cover the time that the project has been
delayed."' Large projects in Idaho may be extended for an additional twelve
years beyond the initial development deadline contained in the permit, so
long as the applicant has expended at least $100,000.&
Similarly, Washington allows extensions if projects are held up by the imposition of federal laws.' In New Mexico, projects must be completed within
live years, and water must be put to beneficial use within four years after that
9
period."
Applicants must pursue their projects diligently, but they will not be
penalized by acts of God, operation of law, or other causes outside of their
control that interfere with construction."0 Generally, extensions will only be
granted up to ten years from the date the application was approved, but the
state engineer may choose to waive this deadline if at least one-lourth of the
actual construction project has been completed within such period, the applicant demonstrates good faith, and "the project will be to the interest of the de-

299. Id. § 73-3-12(4).
300. Sec Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 425 P.2d 405, 407-08 (Utah
1967).
301. Compare id. ("lApplicantl's successful extensions for decades leaving but few years to
go, impel this court, in a conceded equity case, to canvas the facts to deterine if, in this arid
state, where a drop of water is a drop of gold, one, by extension after extension, may equitably
prevent bencicial use of water by others through procedural stagnation for about forty years.

We think not."), nith City & Cnty. of l)enver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d

992, 1005 (Colo. 1954) ("Illn order to sustain Denver's claim, we should have to establish as a
law of Colorado that a great city or a great corporation, by the filing of a plat of a water diversion
plan and the fitful continuance of surveys md exploratory operations, could paralyze all development in a river basin for a period of nineteen years without excavating a single shovel full of
dirt in actual construction and without taking any step towards bond issue or other financing
plan of its own for carrying out its purpose; that for nineteen years no farmer could build a ditch
to develop his farm and no other city or industry could construct a project for use of water in

that area without facing loss of their water when and if the city or corporation which filed the
plat should actually construct its project. This we cannot do."). In other words, "lolne should
not be pernitted to play the (log in the manger with water he does not or cannot use for a beneficial purpose when other lands are crying for water." Allen v. Petrick, 222 P. 451, 453 (Mont.

1924).
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velopment of the state."'
III other words, Colorado could craft a nuanced statute that would allow
active developers to pursue their projecLs while curtailing those projects that
have been postponed until development becomes profitable."' A tine limit
would prevent sone projects, but that is the necessary trade-off for a predictable rule of law. This is the detennination the Colorado Supreme Court made
in Vidle:--while tie company may not have had speculative intentions, it was
preferable to have a bright line rule that helped prevent priorities hoarding.
VII. CONCLUSION
Colorado water law is based on the egalitarian principle that water should
be broadly distributed anong potential beneficial users. The application of
beneficial use changes the distribution, however, by allowing appropriators to
accumulate as imuch as they can beneficially use. Until then, potential beneficial users should have equal opportunity to appropriate water. Without COnditional rights, long-term, forward-thinking projects would never reach fruition. But the purpose of conditional rights is to provide security until a project
is completed, not to allow appropriators to postpone developlment until it is
most profitable. Under current law, appropriators have the ability to preserve
conditional rights indefinitely, and judicial checks, often in deference to tle
legislature, have been ineffective at curbing appropriators from abusing conditional rights. Some conditional rights have been waiting for development for a
century. This is not consistent With the purpose of conditional rights, nor is it
consistent with the policies underlying prior appropriation as a whole. Because of this, Colorado should adopt a statutory expiration date for conditionA rights. This would build certainty back into tie priority system, consistent
with the principles of egalitarianism and justice on which prior appropriation
was founded.

309.

Id.§ 72-5-14.

310. See Podolak & Dovic, supra note 19, at 16, 29 ("A small percentage (9%) of conditional
water rights are perfected in the first two diligence periods (12) years. The remainder seems to
he held until they become more valuable to tie user.").

